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 Arnold Berleant 
 
 AESTHETICS AND COMMUNITY 
 
 
Political science and political theory possess a parallel appeal for understanding human 
society, the one presumably grounded on fact, the other on ideas.  'Presumably,' of course, is an 
essential qualifier, since, as in religious and moral thought, it is especially difficult to separate 
facts from ideas, and both of these from ideological presuppositions.  Political theory and 
science, moreover, can be said to have had a parallel origin in western thought, the first in Plato's 
writings on the state, in which the idea of practice was never absent; the second in the political 
philosophy of Aristotle, which combined classification and judgment with its descriptions.  This 
tells us something, moreover, about the complementarity, perhaps the inseparability of theory and 
science.   
 
Yet neither political science nor political theory seems to satisfy entirely our desire to 
understand the structure and workings of human society.  This is in part because the forms and 
conditions of societies have varied as widely as assessments of their success, and generalization 
is precarious.  Moreover, dissatisfaction and disapproval, from within the social order and from 
without, have regularly led to efforts at change, some of them transformative.  Given such 
discontent, it is little wonder that since classical times philosophers and political theorists have 
attempted to envision what a truly satisfactory human order would be like, a moral order, a state 
of social happiness.  Sometimes these proposals have been ameliorative, sometimes utopian, but 
always significant. 
 
The usual approach to social order is a political one, classification by governmental form, 
by the pattern in which power is distributed.  Hence the common contrast of such forms as 
monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, republic, democracy, and state communism.  But political order 
is not the most basic level of analysis.  It rests on several assumptions, assumptions about what 
people are like, including beliefs about human nature and, indeed, that there is such a thing as 
human nature; about people's motives and goals; about power as an isolable quantity; and about 
the nature of society.  In contrast, I should like to propose a somewhat novel grouping of 
communities, an order based instead on the character and quality of human relations, on the 
nature of social experience.  Although social experience is not something either simple in 
structure or quantifiable, it has the virtue of being directly accessible, certainly to the participants 
and, in one form or another, to everyone, and it can be described in some fashion, literally to a 
degree and figuratively in ways that can be understandable. 
 
What I should like to offer here is a preliminary sketch of a larger project, but one that I 
hope makes a significant statement about community.  Beginning with some observations about 
individual and community, surely the central factors insocial philosophy, I shall propose a 
convenient schema within which to place many of the endlessly varied instances of human 
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association.  This is not an exercise in typology, for the rational, the moral, and the aesthetic 
communities, the forms I shall use, are not pure nor are they logically exclusive.  They do, 
however, distinguish different kinds of social experience and understanding, and they are useful 
for grouping actually existing societies.  Most important, they represent real alternatives in social 
choice.  Since theoretical ideas and moral criteria underlie every conception of community, and 
since normative experience is the basis on which we must evaluate social forms, let me begin 
with some observations about ethics.   
 
The rich history of ethical thought contains a wide range of views on issues too different 
to be presented accurately along a single continuum.  These vary sharply in conception and in 
what considerations are taken as basic.  The most common contrast is likely that between 
utilitarianism, or what may be called the ethics of prudence, and Kantian ethics, or what we may 
term the morality of conscience.  These are not, as is sometimes thought, true opposites, since 
they do not differ on the same point but rather diverge sharply in approach.  Utilitarianism is an 
ethic of action, endorsing the careful consideration of means and consequences with the object of 
obtaining maximum satisfaction.  And since satisfaction is always a matter of personal 
experience, the seat of value and the touchstone for judgment lie wholly in the individual.  The 
Kantian ethic, in contrast, focuses on motive, on intent, and the moral process is carried out 
through introspective examination and the decision of an autonomous will.  While all this is well 
known, it is important to recognize that both utilitarian and Kantian ethics are essentially theories 
whose moral center lies in the individual:  It is the individual whose satisfaction or will 
determines the moral character of a situation.  And while both theories take social considerations 
into account, the one by calculating the extent of satisfaction and suffering, and the other by the 
imperative of universalization, it is important to recognize that these extensions to a wider venue 
are secondary additions to what is at heart a private ethic. 
 
Both the ethics of prudence and the morality of conscience rest, moreover, on 
assumptions that are, in fact, articles of faith.  The first posits the ultimacy of the individual, a 
distinct and separate being located in a rational universe, a rational being whose intelligence is 
largely calculative.  Mill's introduction of qualitative experience is a futile attempt to correct the 
private nature of quantitative judgments of pleasure, futile because it attempts to reconcile two 
antithetical factors:  the personal character of experience with cultural standards of value.  These 
are incompatible in practice as well as theory, as social conflict and political controversy in our 
own day show only too well.   
 
Kantian ethics has its own share of presuppositions, for it inherits the unhappy baggage of 
the dualistic tradition, locating the will in a hidden noumenal realm and denying the possibility of 
knowledge there, as Kant bravely affirmed, "in order to make room for faith."  Although he had 
thought to provide an adequate grounding for morality, Kant mistook the uneasiness of his 
dogmatic slumber for an awakening, as Dewey wryly observed.  For seen in the way I have just 
described, both the morality of conscience and the ethics of prudence are dogmatic philosophies: 
 They make untoward assumptions about experience, about knowledge, and about values, 
assumptions we now recognize to be fraught with difficulty and infused with error. 
 
The last century and a half has seen important developments in ethical and social thought 
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that have moved beyond the dogmas that burden the classic accounts.  Attempting to overcome 
their difficulties, many of the later proposals appear to have taken sharply different directions, 
although ironically the earlier assumptions often seem to reappear in new guises.  In Nietzsche's 
case, the refreshing transvaluation of values onto a naturalistic plane nonetheless preserves 
elements of the individualism and deliberate irrationality of Kant.  Although pragmatism 
expanded utilitarianism's range of consequences and recognized the inseparability of ends from 
the means for reaching them, it has had difficulty finding a place for modes of rationality that are 
noncalculative and for modes of thought that are nonrational.  And in existential freedom one can 
even find a radical Kantianism, with its puzzling juxtaposition of subjectivism and universality.  
While it is unfair to pass over such important contributions with a mere gesture, we must 
nonetheless recognize that they have not succeeded in providing a satisfactory grounding for 
social ethics, and people, desperate for direction, have seized on elements of self-transcendence 
and mysticism in Eastern religion or have translated morality into technologies of thought control 
and behavior.
1
   
 
Is it possible to restructure moral thought in a way that not only avoids the dogmatic 
pitfalls of traditional ethics but provides a theory less constrained by self-serving assumptions?  I 
should like to explore some alternatives to see how far they can take us in a fresh direction and, 
in addition, to determine whether they can offer support for a different approach to the problems 
of political philosophy.  This requires not just reconsidering the assumptions of traditional ethics 
but grounding ethics in what by now we understand far better about human thought, society, and 
culture.  
 
Foremost in this rethinking of ethics is our understanding of the essential sociality of 
human being.  Philosophy lags far behind what the human sciences have established to a 
compelling degree.  In both direct and subtle ways, ethical theory struggles with problems 
involving egoism, conscience, self, moral autonomy, and responsibility, problems structured in 
forms that preserve in one way or another the discreteness, the separateness, of the moral 
individual.  Reconstructing social thought on the basis of the social human forces us to rethink 
these problems in radical ways, ways that follow the long-established tradition in philosophy, not 
of solving such "problems," but of entirely recasting them or even rejecting them entirely. 
 
Consider some of the issues centering around moral responsibility.  The traditional 
construction of the moral universe is one in which motives, decisions, and obligations rest at 
heart in the autonomous individual.  The self must freely make its own decisions and be judged 
by them, based either on its intent or its actions.  What happens to this ordering of the moral 
situation if we discard the notion of the self-sufficient moral individual and recognize that the 
self is a social construct and even a social product?  We cannot, then, speak of a single person, 
since persons do not come singly.  Conflicts between egoism and altruism, self and other, are 
transformed into alternative social complexes in which personal and social factors are variously 
intermingled.  The very notion of a moral universal, itself the product of an individualistic ethic 
as the sum of all individuals, must be transformed into degrees of generality that rest on social 
groups, not quantitative collections of selves.  What this means, then, is that morality is no 
individual matter but always a social one, that no values exist in isolation, and that moral issues 




Ethical egoism and its contrary, an altruistic ethic, are difficult to overcome.  An eloquent 
illustration of their persistence is the feminist alternative to the theory of rights, the ethic of care. 
 Care appears to be a welcome corrective to the self-preservative notion of rights.  Indeed, it 
replaces the litigious focus of rights with motives of concern for others and benevolent actions.  
Instead of calculating personal benefit, it directs our regard toward others.  Care is not only in 
sharp contrast to narrow self-interest but it makes a noble addition to a tradition of generosity and 
selfless service.  Another form of altruism, care stands by way of contrast to the masculinist ethic 
of self-aggrandizement.  Yet at the same time the ethic of care remains within an individualistic 
frame.  It informs personal decisions, motivates private acts, and centers on particular cases. 
 
There are alternatives to this egoistic frame.  In discussing the inescapability of self-
reference in the form of personal satisfaction in any presumably benevolent act, John Dewey 
draws a critical distinction between acting as a self and acting for a self.
2
  While ethical egoism 
conflates these, they are actually quite different.  Whatever action one performs, one cannot help 
acting in some sense as a self, since that is the condition of any deliberate action.  In any action, a 
self acts:  There can be no action without someone's performing it.  This is quite different from 
performing an action directed to one's personal benefit, that is, acting for oneself.  The fallacy in 
ethical egoism lies in regarding all cases in which one acts as a self as instances of acting for 
oneself, whereas the latter is only a special case of the former.  Ethical egoism is, therefore, not a 
universal condition but a particular one. 
 
Another example of a non-egocentric ethic is Erich Fromm's distinction between 
selfishness, self-love, and self-interest.
3
  From a psychotherapeutic perspective, these are quite 
different, Fromm claims.  Selfishness is a form of self-aggrandizement, feeding one's weakness 
in a futile effort to overcome what is actually a kind of self-hatred.  This is futile, since no 
quantity of personal gain can fill a lack that is of an entirely different sort, a lack of genuine self-
regard.  Self-love, on the other hand, is the precondition to loving others, not opposed to it.  It 
reaches out from strength, not weakness, and draws people together toward a common 
fulfillment.  One's true self-interest does not lie in private satisfactions but in the ability to 
conjoin one's personal value with that of others, so that instead of these interests being opposed, 
we recognize them as actually interdependent. 
 
What these two cases show us is that resolving the problem of ethical egoism does not 
require endorsing one form of the egoism-altruism alternative or the other but rather lies in 
surpassing both, that is, in restructuring the ethical problem in such a way as to transcend the 
conflict.  We begin to realize that self and other are not moral alternatives because there is no 
separate self and no distinct other.  Each is mutually implicated to such a degree that they cannot 
be thought apart.  Self is truly other, other truly self. 
 
Not only, then, is ethics social ethics, morality social morality, but any attempt to rest 
ethics on the distinct and separate individual is fictitious, albeit a conventional and time-honored 
fiction.  On the other hand, it is equally important to recognize that rejecting a self-centered ethic 
does not mean endorsing the disappearance of the person into an anonymous society and 
relinquishing self-direction and responsibility.  The dialectical opposition of individual and 
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society is itself a product of the very ethical individualism we are questioning.  In its place 
emerges the social human, a new concept for moral philosophy but an old reality of moral life.  
 
Three different directions are possible, then:  one that centers on the individual, one on 
the group, and a third that joins them, not in the form of a synthesis, which is a consequent stage, 
but as a prior, first condition of being human--the social human.  With some of the issues and 
ideas now before us, let us see how they are reflected in different conceptions of community.  
While these characterizations may not often appear in clear form, they nonetheless represent the 
dominant tone of many of the societies we find ourselves part of, a social condition that is rarely 
chosen and often not clearly grasped. 
 
The rational community is a community of individuals that sees society as an artificial 
construct and the state, as Hobbes characterized it, as a leviathan, a monster to be feared, 
opposed, and tolerated at best as an unwelcome necessity.  The philosophy of this community is 
utilitarianism in one form or another, from Bentham's classic mode to Rawls's more recent 
adaptation.  Central to the rational community is the individual, motivated by self-interest, 
guided by reason, and protected by rights.  It is the model assumed by political liberalism and 
economic individualism.  Habermas's defense of rationality belongs here, too, for even though 
the ego may be formed in social relations, the social order consists in the relations of subjective 
selves with other such selves.  In the rational community, the essential antinomy of self and other 
underlies social experience and the two remain irreconcilable.   
 
What guides individual action in the rational community are prudential motives, a careful 
calculation of costs and benefits in which nothing is done spontaneously or gratuitously.  When 
collaborative action occurs, it is because people identify common interests.  Common interest, in 
fact, is the vehicle of social action, whether in government, in law, or in the many interest groups 
that form and dissolve as the occasion demands.  Acts of spontaneous generosity may occur in 
the rational community when people are moved by tragedy, great personal need, enthusiasm, or a 
powerful common threat, as in war.  These, however, are exceptions to the rule, and are always 
accompanied by opportunists on the prowl for ways to turn every circumstance to personal gain.  
Yet increasingly complex economic dependencies and increasingly sophisticated technologies 
require collaborative action and drive people together.  And while the rational community 
continues to characterize the modern industrial nation state, it is coming now to justify 
internationalism, whether in the form of trading zones, corporate organization, or political union, 
all these, however, devised for personal, private benefit. 
 
The rational community is more a social order than a community, for whatever is 
common is so merely by the circumstantial concurrence of private interests.  Its principles 
infiltrate every deliberate action and each social domain.  Economically the rational community 
justifies a pattern of activity in which every individual pursues his or her self-interest.  Because 
interests rest on need and desire, and desire is never satiated, and because in an economy of 
scarcity there is never enough to satisfy everyone, competition is pervasive.  Opposition 
characterizes all economic relations, those among the producers and suppliers of services, those 
among the purchasers of goods and services, and those between both groups.  Politically, too, a 
society of individuals pursuing separate and opposed interests means that political decisions are 
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made with the view to satisfying special interests.  Such interests are represented formally by the 
electoral mechanisms of political democracy in which everyone expresses his or her interests by 
casting a single vote, and informally by lobbies, pressure groups, and powerful economic and 
political forces that promote their own interests by soliciting and manipulating blocs of 
"individual" votes by ethnic, racial, and monetary appeals and promises. 
 
Although the rational society is best known in its political and economic expressions, it is 
actually pervasive.  It informs social thought in the belief in individual autonomy, the idea that 
we exist as persons separate and apart from society, and in the belief that personal freedom is 
secured only through watchful opposition to social action.  As the adversarial system in law, it is 
central to the judicial process.  As the belief in free will which endows each person with moral 
autonomy, it stands at the center of conventional morality.  Even the goals of psychotherapy--
emotional independence, wholeness, self-sufficiency, and freedom--reflect this individualistic 
social ideal.  Moreover, the fixation of the therapeutic process on the "self," on self-development 
and the cultivation of self-confidence and assertiveness, reflects the same individualistic bent, 
although viewed from a different perspective, the "self" appears more like a folk category than 
the entity it is usually taken to be.  And, of course, such a psychology encourages and rationalizes 
aggressiveness, its characteristic and common behavioral form.  Finally, there is a whole 
philosophical industry at work supporting the status quo of the rational society.  In addition to 
utilitarian philosophy, there is the preeminent concept of the ego, expressed in various forms of 
subjectivism, intersubjectivity, and the correlative "problem" of the other. 
 
Any alternative to this interplay of interests is difficult to envision, so deeply has it 
become rooted in the modern mentality.  Yet signs have begun to appear with increasing 
frequency, as the twentieth century moves implacably toward its end, signs of changes and of 
forces that undermine the premises of the rational community.  First among these is the growing 
recognition that self-sufficiency, one of the dominant cultural myths of western societies, is a 
false ideal.  It has, in fact, always been an exaggeration, since wherever it has appeared it has 
rested on a social bedrock.  Embracing the model of economic self-sufficiency, the homesteader 
or pioneer not only brings along equipment and supplies but, more important still, utilizes a vast 
body of knowledge and technology developed and accumulated by thousands of generations of 
hardship and trial.  This exposes the fallacy in economic self-interest:  that interests are 
fundamentally private and opposed, and that the independent, conflicting pursuit of those 
interests, which we call competition, is the best mechanism to their greatest fulfillment.  Even 
that arch individualist, Hobbes, recognized that benefits beyond mere survival require social 
order and collaborative action.  Individualism rests on a social foundation. 
 
It helps in rethinking the ideas that center around the rational society to draw a distinction 
between weak and strong dependence.  Weak dependence is what we usually mean when we 
speak of dependence, and it is pervasive.  In its sexual form, it is found both in taking the other 
and in giving oneself up to the other.  In marriage it is monogamy imposed from without through 
legal form and social convention.  In social groups it appears as hierarchical organization and as 
the persecution of minorities and the weak.  It takes political form in the need for power over 
others and in the cult of the leader.  Psychologically it is found equally in selfish behavior and in 
selflessness, as Fromm pointed out, the one intended to strengthen a separate self, the other to 
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evade one's personhood.  All these express weak dependence because they derive their force from 
some external source and their application lies wholly beyond the person.  One does not gain 
strength from weak dependence:  On the contrary, it reinforces one's weakness by focusing 
energies elsewhere and leaving the person essentially untouched.   
 
Strong dependence, on the other hand, is not a sign of emotional or psychological 
insufficiency; rather, it recognizes the fundamental incompleteness of the human person.  Seen in 
this way, dependence is not a weakness or a defect.  Fulfillment is rather achieved through 
harmonious connections with others, with social forms, and with environment, connections that 
implicate and change a person.  Strong dependence takes equally many forms.  Biologically, it 
consists in promoting life through the family and whatever other forms mutual domestic support 
may take.  Psychologically, it recognizes the manifold ways in which one develops character and 
personhood through relations with other people.  Social, strong dependence finds in voluntary 
forms of social order a condition for personal growth, each inseparable from the other.  Even 
environment must be reconceptualized from surroundings separate from oneself to a matrix 
continuous with and inclusive of ourselves, a constant process of reciprocity among all the active 
factors.  Environment becomes that interrelated system of dependencies we call an ecosystem.
4
  
Among nations, too, there is a slowly increasing awareness of interdependence, not in alliances 
and the various forms of political domination, all of which express weak dependency, but in legal 
relations and forms, such as international law, the United Nations, the World Court, and the 
gradual realization that national sovereignty is a political myth that has lost its usefulness.  
Economically, too, strong dependence appears in recognizing ways in which mutual interests can 
be served by carefully expanding trade relations, removing barriers, and replacing economic 
exploitation with forms of assistance that benefit both the donor and the receiver of aid.  Strong 
dependence even assumes a cosmic scale as we begin to realize that pollution does not observe 
national boundaries and that industrial practices and commercial policies and products have 
planetary consequences.  All these expressions of strong dependence rest on the premise, a fact 
rather than an assumption, that our fulfillment as persons and as societies is part of a single 
process and a single condition, a process and a condition that involve multiple factors.  'Person,' 
indeed, becomes a social category, the node of intersecting connections. 
 
Let me speak more briefly of a second social form, the moral community.  Unlike the 
community of self-interested individuals, the moral community rests on the insight that multiple 
bonds connect people with each other.  It recognizes that people are interdependent and the 
relationships among them reciprocal.  The ethical foundation of the moral community is the 
morality of conscience and its classic formulation can be found in the philosophy of Kant.  For 
him, moral obligation is the binding force that holds beyond choice or desire.  An inner self 
ultimately stands alone with its moral choice.  We may not desire its demands and we may 
choose to disregard them, but this has no effect on its moral authority.  The will must determine 
its guiding principle for itself, yet in doing so it represents every rational being.  In this way, the 
morality of the individual becomes at the same time the force that unites humankind. 
 
This version of the moral community shares two essential features with the community 
we have just discussed--its rationality and its ultimate individualism.  Qualifying the 
individualism of the moral community, however, are internal forces that press toward a larger 
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order, embracing and joining together morally separate beings into an uneasy confederation of 
the private and the social.  For Kant this is the powerful stipulation of universalization, which 
frames the moral demand so that it can extend to everyone.  In authoritarian societies, the ethic of 
hierarchy binds individuals into a rigid pyramid of power.  As this amalgam becomes more 
complete, it may reach a point at which the members not only identify with the community but 
become utterly absorbed into it, relinquishing independent judgment and personal decision.  
When it so overwhelms and suppresses individual volition, the moral community has turned into 
the organic community. 
 
The organic community can assume a variety of forms.  In a rigidly structured 
hierarchical order, power filters downward from its pinnacle, from level to increasingly broader 
level, each deriving a lesser degree of power until none remains at the bottom.  In an autocratic 
society, a single leader exercises dominant power and its members are subsumed by the whole, 
achieving their identity, their very being, as part of that whole.  While institutional good is the 
binding element and the ethos of the group glorifies the social process, an authoritarian center of 
power and privilege wields influence and dispenses goods.  To varying degrees and in distinctive 
ways, most religious groups, quasi-religious cults, corporations, and military organizations 
exemplify the organic community.  At its most extreme form, the organic community absorbs its 
members into the corporate body, withholding the ability for any independent action, any 
autonomy of will, any vestige of identity apart from the group, all in the interests of devotion to a 
"higher" call.  The organic community achieves its most complete development in the fascist 
state or fanatic movement, where the moral imperative of "blood and soil," ethnic purity, national 
destiny, or religious zeal sucks up all separate wills into the irrepressible force of an exclusive 
group.   
 
These modes of community--the rational, the moral and its derivative, the organic--are 
limited, for the quality of human relations they engender lacks a genuine continuity of individual 
and social.  Coolly calculating one's rational self-interest, bravely standing in moral isolation, 
futilely seeking society through intersubjectivity, lost in the endless depths of a searching 
conscience or the anonymity of a faceless group, these forms do not succeed in developing the 
precondition for genuine community--a unity of individual and social in which neither dimension 
dominates but each enhances the possibilities of the other.   
 
It is this condition to which the aesthetic community aspires.  This form moves beyond 
customary ways of thinking about community and, while it has certain resemblances to the other 
modes, it is important to avoid the temptation to assimilate it to them.  The aesthetic community 
is not an order of individuals, either in the rational sense or the moral one, nor is it a community 
whose participants relinquish their individuality and deliver themselves into the hands of a leader 
or become absorbed into a corporate identity.  Its fundamental features are distinctive, and to 
grasp the aesthetic community, we must stand outside the convenient, conventional categories by 
which we usually order our understanding of human relations and social groups. 
 
Every community proclaims some kind of unity, sometimes more in word than in fact.  
Organic unity, in which the parts have no separate existence but are are bound to and subsumed 
under a whole, is often taken as the paradigmatic sense of the term.  These parts may have a 
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distinct identity but they lack independence.  Like the limbs and organs of a living creature, the 
underlying metaphor, they function within a whole from which they gain their value and 
meaning.  Although organic unity is sometimes ascribed to a work of art, the aesthetic bond is 
quite different.  Art carries a more subtle sense of connection that illuminates the aesthetic 
significance of community, a bond best described by the similar though not cognate word, 
'continuity.'   
 
Continuity is not absorption or assimilation, nor is it an external relation between separate 
things.  It suggests, instead, connectedness within a whole rather than a link between discrete 
parts.  Much as William James argued that relations are not external connections but have an 
immediacy that is directly present and real to experience, relationships in a fulfilled community 
are not imposed from without but are inherent in the situation in ways that are concrete and 
operative.
5
  The aesthetic community exemplifies this.  Internal relations are, in fact, one 
expression of continuity.  The connections among the members of an aesthetic community are as 
real, as much a part of the community, as the people, themselves.  Not only are there no sharp 
boundaries; there are no divisions.  Nor is there any sense in which the society or state is separate 
from the people who compose it.  Their relation does rest on internalized control (the moral 
model), on independence and self-sufficiency (the rational model), on isolation (both the moral 
and rational models), or on domination (the organic model).  Relationships of reciprocity and 
strong dependence among the participants in an aesthetic community replace the barriers and 
separations that mark the other social modes.    
 
Continuity, moreover, allows for differences, although these are usually not marked by 
abrupt changes but by gradations, as between the colors in a spectrum.  Sharp contrasts may 
occur, but these are part of a larger harmony.  This sense of continuity is not vacuous, however.  
It denotes a merging that joins things already bound together rather than a combination of distinct 
and separate elements.  As the motivic features of a large symphonic movement contribute to the 
character of the total auditory experience by their contrasts as much as their resemblances, human 
continuities denote a bond that overrides differences.  Fusion occurs on a more basic level.   
 
One sense of continuity is perceptual and material, a sense of one's body that at the same 
time incorporates, in a literal sense, the food one ingests, the air one breathes, the clothes one 
wears, the objects one uses, the place one inhabits, the experiences one has.  Consciousness is 
also part of this perceptual continuity, for whether we describe ourselves as an embodied 
consciousness or a reflective organism, multidimensional continuities unite our cognitive, 
volitional, and physical dimensions.  Humans have continuity, too, with nature.  Nature as we 
live it is environment, and environment is no external surrounding but the physical context and 
its order of meanings of which we are a contributing and dependent part.
6
  But it is in the 
continuities that unify people that community arises.  Here are the connections of place, of 
human association, of language.  Here too are the connections of time as history, tradition, and 
personal experience.  What makes continuity aesthetic is the kind of unity it describes:  a 
continuum of body, of consciousness, of context, all joined in the pervasive continuity of 
perception. 
 
In a germinal sense, we can discover the aesthetic community in the relationship between 
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close companions or friends, where a bond may evolve that leads people to surpass the 
conventional limits of the self to attain what Aristotle called perfect friendship.  This is 
friendship between those who are good and  who so desire the good of each other that one is 
able to feel the other's experience as in some way coincident with one's own.
7
  In the community 
of friends the self expands to include the friend and cannot be known apart.  The thought of the 
one is always inhabited by the presence of the other. 
 
The erotic community may have more persistence.  This community of lovers joins 
people in a multidimensional unity conventionally described as physical, emotional, and spiritual. 
 What is important here is that the erotic community represents a connection that transcends the 
customary boundaries that isolate people.  It is the closest many of us come to the sense of 
community I call aesthetic, not a loss of self in sexual ecstasy but the dissolution of protective 
barriers and a heightened sense of self-with-other.  This is clearly an entirely different matter 
from purely sexual release, whose satisfaction is brief and largely organic and may even narrow 
into self-indulgent isolation. 
 
These germinal communities are usually not residential or continuous in time; they are 
likely to be circumstantial and may not possess long duration.  Still other occasions offer an 
intimation of the aesthetic community.  One is the bonding within the aura of the sacred that 
sometimes accompanies religious experience.  In the feelings of sisterhood and brotherhood, of 
love and charity, the religious community dissolves the boundaries that separate people and 
approaches the aesthetic.  In its elements of transcendence and its tendency toward the mystical, 
however, the religious differs markedly from the aesthetic.  Another experience of unity occurs in 
the intimacy of our association with art, where a sense of connectedness may develop that is the 
prototype of the aesthetic community.  At its most generous and powerful, our engagement with 
art creates a unity of experience that joins artist, appreciator, art object, and performer into a 
heterogeneous field of continuous forces.  This is the qualitative source of the aesthetic 
community. 
 
In the past some philosophers have recognized forms of bonding that anticipate the 
aesthetic sense of community.  Locke claimed that society exists in a state of nature under the 
sway of natural law and before any agreement to organize.  Nietzsche had the insight that the 
unifying aesthetic experience exemplified by Greek tragedy offers the ground for life in society, 
for communality.  Husserl's idea that everything must be seen in context and within the horizon 
of the world in which it is presented led him to the notion that the life-world is made up of 




What, then, is an aesthetic community?  What kind of phenomenon does the term 
describe, or is it but an assumption, a construct, a fiction, an ideal?  Does the aesthetic 
community realize continuity through certain kinds and networks of relationships?  Like all 
language that does not wholly create its object, the concept is an approximation, an attempt to 
locate and identify something apprehended more or less dimly yet with the force of significant 
reality.   
 
The difference between an observer's and a participant's perception of a social situation 
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may lead us to clearer sense of the aesthetic community.  What to the observer is clearly 
demarcated and structured may, to the participant, be fluid and responsive.  Because both the 
rational community and the moral community are at bottom communities of individuals, they 
often reflect an ironic contrast between observer and participant.  One can think of oneself as an 
American individualist and yet be enclosed in a stifling corporation, have an overbearing spouse 
yet feel comfortably married, be politically powerless yet be an ardent patriot.  One can be part of 
a close family or other intimate group and yet feel alienated from it, insecure, lost, helpless, a 
stranger in a familiar land.                     
 
Forms of control are understood somewhat better now than in the past, and we can see 
how this split between the world of the participant and that of the observer may be fostered by 
state-organized societies that are inimical to community.  People often experience realities 
falsely, and states may deliberately foster false consciousness.  From thought control and news 
management to outright censorship, the state, whatever its ideological persuasion, has long been 
adept at manipulating its citizenry, managing from the standpoint of an observer its citizen 
participants.  In all these cases, observer and participant occupy different orders; they speak 
foreign languages, not easily translated and communicated. 
 
In the aesthetic community, the contrast between observer and participant develops more 
subtly.  These two stances do not occupy different realities, each of which may be false to the 
other, as in the other modes of community.  Rather, they rest on the same level and, when the 
awareness of an experience becomes yet another dimension of that very experience, they inform 
one another.  Because the participant is, as such, actively engaged in community, this 
engagement becomes the primary mode and the self-awareness of observation secondary and 
dependent.  The observer who is not a participant cannot truly grasp an aesthetic community.  
Both observer and participant must inhabit the same harmonious reality. 
 
The aesthetic community is a community in and of experience.  Its resemblance to the 
situation in which we experience art lends it its name.  In art when the potential of the aesthetic 
field is fulfilled, a rich reciprocity develops among the artist's creative force, the art object, its 
appreciator, and the performer or activator of the work.  Contemplative distancing and the 
presumed objectification of the knowledge process are foreign to this situation.  Aesthetic 
engagement defines its character instead.  The same reciprocity of constituent parts, the 
multiplicity of interrelated functions, the assimilation of observer into participant, the salience of 




* In a compelling passage in I and Thou, Martin Buber describes the personal encounter 
that establishes what he calls the world of relation.
10
  The intimacy of this world joins what are 
ordinarily considered quite disparate things, and the kinds of things with which we can engage in 
this way, Buber shows, are perhaps surprising:  first nature, then people, and ultimately, the 
creative engagement of art.   
 
Nature we regard as the exemplary object of the sciences.  Its philosophical ramifications 
excite the foundational questions of metaphysics and particularly of ontology--questions of order, 
of purpose, and ultimately of the very meaning and being of reality.  Yet the usual way of 
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understanding nature, both for science and for philosophy, rests on objectification and analysis.  
Furthermore, over the past century and a half, the social and behavioral sciences have taken the 
field in their examination of human orders and institutions.  The philosophical dimensions of this 
are nearly as ancient in their origins as ontology, for the quest for an ethical grounding of human 
relationships has preoccupied thinkers since Socrates and K'ung-fu-tsu (Confucius), and the 
authors of the Old Testament were concerned with such matters long before that.  Here, too, the 
cognitive process has, until recent times, followed the same scientific and philosophical model of 
disinterested objectivity and rational analysis.   
 
Yet both our relation with nature and with people can transcend the objectification with 
which we ordinarily think to distance them.  In what Buber calls 'life with nature,' we join in a 
relation of undivided reciprocity with things.  In 'life with men' we do not separate ourselves 
from others but experience a personal bond that joins us.  But it is in the third order, life with 
spiritual beings, that the transformative process of intimacy reveals itself most compellingly.  It 
may seem strange for Buber to place art here, but once we recognize in it the act of origination, 
the discovery that had not found its tongue before, we realize how art epitomizes so fully this 
high human accomplishment.  Yet this kind of life appears not only in the objects and occasions 
we fashion by our art; they are still more pervasive in that kind of experience which we associate 
with art objects and by which we identify them as such--aesthetic experience.  Such experience, 
moreover, is not the exclusive province of art but can be extended to embrace nature, as well.  
And more to our point, it also encompasses the human.   
 
In Buber's world of relation, then, we do not objectify, rationalize, order, and control 
things, but rather enter into an intimate association with them.  All three of its modes exemplify 
an association that does not join together discrete entities but involves a kind of giving in which 
we establish a deep connection.  Carrying this farther, we can see in it more than a connection but 
a continuity, and, eventually even more, a community, an aesthetic community.   
 
A social aesthetic here joins an aesthetic of art and an aesthetic of nature with an aesthetic 
of humans.  All three of Buber's worlds--nature, humans, and art--are domains of the same 
aesthetic realm, a remarkable coalescence of diverse orders into a single, embracing unity of 
experience.  What science has divided into the natural world, the human world, and the 
mythological world; what philosophy has separated into metaphysics, ethics, and the philosophy 
of art--all regain their primal unity in the region of the aesthetic.  The aesthetic community is a 
social aesthetic joining humans and environment in multidimensional reciprocity.  As the human 
environment consists not of places and buildings but of their complex connections with human 
uses and human participants, an aesthetic community recognizes the social dimension of 




These forms of community--the rational, the moral and its offspring, the organic, and the 
aesthetic--are clear forms, ideal forms of a sort but not unattainable "ideals," for they occur in 
different spheres and in a variety of ways.  By identifying instances of such communities and by 
articulating their character and their differences, we can know better how to live in them and how 
to guide them.  Understanding the alternative forms of community also enables us to make 
deliberate choices of which to pursue.  What stands here as a study in social philosophy and 
 
 13 
political theory is, at the same time, a matter of political science and practice, and perhaps the 
cardinal occasion of applied aesthetics.  At this stage in social evolution and at this millenial 
point in human history, is any task of philosophy more compelling? 
 
*Chapter Nine of A. Berleant, Living in the Landscape:  Toward an Aesthetics of Environment 
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